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Talk All Night : Charles Kades and 
His Reflections on Occupied Japan 
Roger Buckley 
Hrslory rs sources. Fr目トhandaccounts by partrcrpants m the Allred occupation 
of Japan two generatrons after the event must, by defimtron, be both potentrally im-
portant and automatrcally suspect The re<ult may be rllummatron or 1 may spawn 
litle more than meta-history. All depends, of course, on the quahty of the memoirs 
and the extent to which others have successf1叫lyexcavated and analyzed srmrlar 
terram m the half century since Imperial Japan acknowledged rts unconditional sur-
render and consequent occupatron 
The role of Charles Kades as deputy chrefof SCAP's Government Section in the 
conduct of the occupation of Japan deserves much more senous study than this p田
liminary sketch. All that can be attempted he田 isto record a selection of the views he 
held in the last years of his long life on the purposes, development and results of 
policies to which his name is closely linked. It is to be hoped that students on both 
sides of the Pacific will eventually begin to objectrvely assess the achievements of 
the American lawyer m umform whose name will remam inextricably linked to the 
postwar Japanese Constrtutron. 
It is not every senior participant in the occupation who receives obituary notices 
m the!:k旦且旦盟主land editorials m the Japanese press.凹 Thedeath of Charles Kades 
on 18 June 1996 was the occasion, however, for a senes of wide-ranging commentar-
ies of the key individual m what has been termed the 'remventron’of Japan'" 
Rather than retrace the occupation career of Colonel Kades this brief paper iden-
tifies some of hrs remimscences It does so with two important provisos Smee Kades 
lived to the age of 90, it must be assumed that his memones of events over half a 
century earlier m some cases may be suspect and should eventually be tested against 
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the testimony of others. Equally, it needs to be stressed that both the fame and Ion-
gevity of Charles Kades led to a great number of individuals entreating him for his 
recollections He wrote to me once, after I had specifically requested permtSSton to 
quote from coπ・espondence with him on an item of occupation history, that‘I’ve 
been quoted and also misquoted so many times sans permission that I hesitate to start 
a new tradition.＇【勾 Kadeskindly added in the next sentence that‘permission IS not 
only granted for your current paper but for al hereafter written for anything I say’帥
It will eventually be necessary, therefore, to collate the voluminous correspondence 
that Kades entered mto and distil the evidence. His complaints at the manner in 
which mterviews he gave were sometimes mtSused by JOUmalists and film producers 
could be blunt He found t dtSheartening when he had been日lmedfor an entire day 
to dtScover later that the end result might be no more than a couple of thirty second 
soundbttes. 
Yet Kades clearly did wish that htS version of events be known My own meet 
mgs and coπ・espondence were conducted from 1982 until the year before his death 
and it was understood by both parties that no areas were off-limits. Kades could be 
scathmg・forexample, both about those individuals surrounding the Emperor and 
senior American State Department figures He would reply with great courtesy to 
questions on Allied policy towards the occupation and spice his lengthy answers 
with salty humour at htS own expense. 
It would be erroneous, however, to suggest that our correspondence was merely 
a senes of bland recollections by Kades. Throughout our dealmgs we never found 
common ground over important issues linked to the making of the postwar Japanese 
Constttution. He continued to disagree with my statement that‘the Constitution was 
an imposed, ahen document', prefernng instead to maintain : 
守hatit would not have been born but for the occupation is undoubtedly true 
but its predecessor was also “imposed”m the sense in which you use the 
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word and the mfluence of the Prusstans, though not many sense coercive as 
was the Americans, was pretty pervasive., and, as for the “freely exp陀 ssed
will of the Japanese people”，that thought was not a gleam in anyone's mind 
a century ago. Some day maybe we can put on shppers and talk al night 
about the degree of democratic part1C1pation m the process of the making 
(and the unmaking) of th巳Meij1compa回dwith the MacArthur constitution＇.由
Since Kades’obituary in the Jn1emational Herald Tribune was headlined‘Draft町
of Japan’s Constitulion Dies', it might be expected that our correspondence would 
C四日間aroundhIS handiwork.抽 Yet出ISdid not prove to be the case I stmply did not 
possess an io阻ofhIS legal background and opted instead merely to question him on 
specific points over the making of the postwar Constitution as they arose in my問－
search叩 Allieddiplomacy aod later political evenls within contemporary Japan l 
was often out of my depth in the field of what a later scholar would term, rather 
sweepmgly perhaps MacMlhnr's Tananese「onsJilnlinnt7l Just to make certain that 
reade四 m the 1990s would get the pomt, the middle word of the ltle of Kyoko 
In凹凸monographwas printed in larger letters on the jacket by the University of 
Chicago Press. 
All I can回cordis that after our initial mee1ing at a confen凹 ceat the MacArthur 
Memorial in Norr.凶k,Virginia, m 1982, Kad田 waskind enough to send me a copy of 
his own note on the making of the Constilution. On the top was written ‘Copy of 
Penicilled Notes of C-of-C handed me on Sunday, 3 Feb. '46 to be the basis of d問自
Constitution'. It reads as follows 
‘Sfil:R!IT 
Emperor is at the head of the state. 
His succession is dynasllc. 
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HIS duties and powe四 willbe exerctSed m accordance with the Constitution 
and responsible to the basic will of the people as provided therein. 
2 
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an 
instrumentality for settling its dtSputes and even for preserving its own secu-
rity It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its 
defense and Its protection. 
No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights 
of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. 
3 
The feudal system of Japan will cease 
No nghts of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond 
the lives of those now existent 
No patent of nob1hty will from this time forth embody within itself any Na-
tional or Civic power of government 
Pattern budget a白.erBrittSh system 
Kades next attached a copy of his回ー draftof point 2 to the Notes on the Constitution 
He stated 
‘I am also enclosing a copy of my re-d田ft; the underlined words I added to 
pmnt 2 of the so called Notes and the words in parentheses I deleted. Except 
for deleting ‘even for preserving its own security' in the second sentence of 
point 2, the draft demonstrates that I was an amanuensis only.’ 
Article 2 was then altered by Kades as follows . 
・Waras a sovereign right of the nation IS abolished (Japan）担且血旦血盟且且E
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国立且f_fQ盟主昼間nounceg(s) as an instrumen1ality for settling (its) disputes 
Eι瓦且血n.盟且且E互いndeven for p回目円ingits own security. It田hesupon 
the htgher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its 
protection). 
No (Japanese) Army, Navy, or Air Fa四eor oJher war ootentml will ever be 
author』zedand no rights of belhge目 ncywill ever be conferred upon any 
(Japanese) olh町 fa目e.＇仰
In other correspond叩 ceKades confirmed that he fully supported what became 
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. Colonel Kades had long held prog町田：iveviews 
on由cdesirability of improving the conduct of internaiional問 ationsand 毘 stricting
the m1htary polential of nation stales. Kades told me, for example, that he had been 
an admirer of Philip Noel-Baker, the pacifist MP whose repu凶 ionin Japan would 
remam high to the e川dof his very long life It was Kades who told me that wh叩‘I
was m the US.τ＂reasury be品目theUS entered WW2 but during the London bomb-
ing, I wrote him Noel-Baker and asked if he would like his MSS for Vol 2 of his 
monumental work on the Pd vale Manufacture of Annament[s] sto問dfor sa自国自ep-
ing in the Treasury vaults. ’I＇句 Kadesthen added with a remarkable curiosity for a 
man 叩pposedlyin田tirementfrom the inlern剖ionalscene ・ 'he sent it w11h his hand 
written editorial changes and I’ve often wonde回d1f he ever relneved it because as 
far as I know Vol 2 was ne>er published. After I was called to active duty m Jan. 
1942 I lost track of 1t and n回目白turnedto Treasury.'"" 
Kades for al his misgivings aboul Jhe fuJure of p田トoccupauonJapan made it 
clear on several occasions Jhat he favoured Jhe so苧calledAshida Amendment Jn Aト
ticle 9. Kades thought m 1983 that some authority in either the UniJed Stales or 
Bntain might tackle the subject of what he boldly termed‘Japan’s Counterrevolution 
After MacArthur'."" but he remained convmced Jhal Jhe righl of self-defense had 
never been deliberately阻 movedby the occupation's Conslitulion-makers Such a 
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secunty policy would have required, m Kades' view, only a highly lumted military 
establishment but he did not then or later to subscribe to anythmg approaching un 
armed neutrality. He also pointed out that Ashida spoke to him befo田 submittingthe 
amendment that would strongly influence Japan’s views of its future security poli一
回目andthe ent1re U.S.-Japan alliance rela11onsh1p over the next two generations 
On the technical quesl!ons involving Anglo-Amencan diplomacy during the oc-
cupation Kades provided considerable information on both the manner in which broad 
policy issues were determmed and how specific issues might be settled. Kades re-
mained consistent in pointing out that the so called Allied occupation of Japan was 
run by General MacArthur. Kades msisted in 1990 that‘unl!l 1949, the policies in 
Japan were pretty much what MacAロhurdesired叩ぬ Kadescontinued ・Irecall see-
ing cables between MacArthur and General George Marshall in which MacArthur 
complained that the direcl!ves were too detailed and Marshall responded that they 
we田 merelyfor his gmdance and he could exercise the normal discrel!on of a theater 
commander m determmmg his courses of action.’t叫
Kades could speak from direct experience on both the initial days of the occupa-
tion and the years that followed He, as a former New Deal lawyer, clearly saw the 
advantages of forceful action m the wake of Japan’s capitulauon. His stance was that 
the rapid actions of General MacArthur were essential to get the occupal!on off on 
the right foot and that neither the Whlle House during the Truman years nor the rival 
de paロmentsm Washmgton played any parl!cularly pronounced role in its conduct is 
important testimony Its advantages were enormous, provided, of course, that the 
pohc1es selected were appropriate for the circumstances of a defeated, demoralized 
Asian polity. On the comprehensive claims of MacArthur (and what would become 
Government Section, SCAP GHQ,) Kades took pride in imtiallves determined in the 
Dai Ichi Buildmg. He would note wllh apparent satisfaction that by the time the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff were in a position to issue !Is Basic Directive for Post-Surrender 
Military Government m Japan Proper, JCS Direcl!ve, 1380/15 of 3 November 1945, 
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'the occupation of Japan was a fa江a旦旦皿叫L叩＂ Since the directtve began by an 
nouncmg that it‘defines the authonty whtch you will possess and the policies which 
will guide you in the occupatton and control of Japan in the initial period after sur-
問nder巾ベtheamusement that thIS must have caused amongst MacArthur’s senior 
staff can be easily imagined 
On the later claims of survivors from the Truman adm1mstrat1on that they and 
their champion had played a m句orrole in the successful postwar transformation of 
Japan, Charles Kades could (understandably) be scathing. When I asked Clark Clifford, 
for example, for his田collecttons,the former Truman aide explained that‘President 
Truman considered US occupation policy a particularly vital issue吋＂＇and thereby 
entttled to take a substantial share of the credit for later developments. While Kades 
noted that he respected Clark Clifford‘very much', he was indignant at Clifford’s 
asserttons In a three-page closely reasoned response, Kades tore into Clifford He 
began by saying: 
‘I thmk Clifford’s leter is hogwash. Although Truman did approve the US 
Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan on Sept 6, 1945, the substance had 
already been sent to MacArthur by radio on Aug. 29th and in the course of its 
preparation by s、NNCCand ts pnor approval by the Joint Chiefs I never 
heard of any input whatsoever by the、/VhiteHouse. During this period I was 
acting executive officer of the、/VarDep’t Civil Affatrs Division (until Aug. 
25th when I flew to Japan via Guam and Manila, amving Aug. 30th) and in 
daily contact with general Hilldrig (Chief of CAD) and Ass’t Secretary of 
State McCloy and if there had been consultati叩 withthe President, I believe 
I would have had some inkhng of it可18)
Kades then contmued with a characteristic remark that displayed both his grasp 
of pohcy debates and important asides that the later historian is prone to overlook. 
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He pointed out that the cntlcal issue of land reform ‘is not even mentioned in the 
lmtlal Policy or many subsequent directive; and Secretary of the Navy John Sulliv叩
who was a close, old personal fnend of mine and a member of SWNCC once told me 
出ateven SWNCC never considered land refoロnbecause it had communistic tenden-
cies and, unless the equivalent of expropriation, would be far too expensive. When 
Roosevelt was President there was plenty of 、l.'hleHouse mput, partly because Lt 
Col John Boettiger, Roosevelt’S son-m-law, who was with the CAD staf, hved in 
由eWhlle House wllh his wife and son '"" 
Yet despite Kades’occasional acerbity towards a number of State Department 
officials and presidenllal aides, the tone of his corτespondence IS extraordinarily mild. 
He clearly continued to voice objection to those he felt had unfairly claimed c四dit
for actions taken by others but he ra田lyemphasized his own achievements. The one 
individual to whom Kades had nothing but the highest regard in our correspondence 
was MacArthur Time and again Kades, who spoke to SCAP most infrequently but 
had the opportumty of observing him at first hand in public and private conferences 
and committees, wo凶dpraise his commander's actions. When, for example, 1 asked 
Kades for comment on the highly techmcal issue of the bargaimng nghts of Japanese 
civd servants during the occupation he unhesllatmgly responded with several pages 
of recollections. Kades’explanation of MacArthur’s behaviour dunng the discussion 
of July 1948 over collectlve bargaining and the desirability or not of restricting the 
nght to strike for public sector employe田 deservesto be known Kades wrote nearly 
thirty five years after the event: 
‘I was pr田entat al tlfies during the mne or ten hours of oral argument be-
fore General MacArthur m July and I have not the slightest recollection of 
there bemg any divisive issue except that of the right to strike and that the 
meaning of collective bargaimng (because the employer is the people) had a 
d1ffe回目connotationwhen the bargaining was between government employ-
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ees, i. e. ClVll servants, and a government department and when t was be-
tween employees in private industry and pnvate management’(20) 
In Kades’nexl letter he added出efollowmg comment on MacArthur's behaviour. 
‘As you no doubt know, his grandfather, Arthur, was a judge in Wisconsin and on the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. I could not help thmking at the ume出at
his grandfather would have been proud of him if he could have watched the way 
MacArthur conducted that July seSSton, so impressed was I with his probing que-
nes.’（21) 
What also emerges from Kades recollections is the close similanty in thinkmg 
between MacArthur and the senior officials of SCAP’S vttal Government Section. 
Kades, m the course of a lengthy comment on Japanese labour affa1rs, could stress 
both the philosophical parallels between himself and Generals MacArthur and Whitney 
and pomt out that their suppo託forhim m the inevitable bureaucratic disputes wtthin 
GHQ was near total. For example, Kades writes of one incident when James Killen, 
chief of Labour Division, Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, sided with the 
stnke activities of the Communications Union under Kazuyoshi Dobashi Kades ex-
plamed that‘MacArthur and Whitney were both away from Tokyo and through Gen-
era! Marquat (Killen's superior) I asked Killen to cal in Dobashi and tel him that 
what his umon was doing amounted to a strike on a national scale which could not be 
tolerated, given the amount of appropriations for assisting Japan which the U.S. 
Congress was providing.’＂ Kades then contmued with a characteristic remark on 
someone who he might well have been expected to feel antagonistic to on many 
grounds. Instead, he continued: 
'Killen refused to put any pressure whatever upon Dobashi, whom I liked 
personally even though he was considered a Communist. The upshot was 
that I called Dobashi to my office and spent about two hours trying to con-
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vince him曲目whathis union was domg was Ill-advised, harmful to the Japa-
nese Government and GHQ, and putting the labor movement in general and 
his own union m pa凶cularin danger of repression or serious counter-mea-
sures. Dobashi then saw or communicated with Killen who protested to 
Marquat that I was trying to take over the Labor D1vis10n's functions which 
infuriated Marquat However, Whitney returned, stood by what I had done, 
and best of al the I田 alstruggles ceased shortly’仰
The commona!tty of po!ttical views between General MacArthur (a Republican 
for ever), General 、l.'httney(a fringe member of the “Bataan gang”and lawyer by 
profession m prewar Manila) and Kades (who described himself to me as an indi-
vidual who had‘always been conside田da dte一hardNew Dealer’） remains su甲ns-
ing. Kades, agam employing the long historical view that he had acquired through 
his legal profession, would note that for MacArthur the Zaibatsu deconcentration 
schemes contained strong echoes of an ear!ter American trust-busting era Kades 
suggested that he had‘always thought’that MacArthur’s‘deep seated objecuon to 
concentrated economic power (or to what both he and FDR called “private soロal-
ism”） stemmed from the time (when I was over a yearold, 1907) he served as an aide 
at White House functions to President τ'heodore Roosevelt whose trust-busting views 
were well known to MacArthur who as a lieutenant had, nevertheless, many evenmg 
conversations, after the guests had gone home, with the President not only about 
monopolies but also the Far East柑 1Kades added that “Whitney also stood for free, 
private, competitive enterprise and early in the Occupation had been offended by the 
aπ・ogance of one of the clique Both were strongly opposed to the Biggers/Kauffman 
efforts to entrench U.S.。ligopolistsm Japan.＇《凶
Linked to Kades’deep interest in the refonnat1on of postwar Japan was the ques-
tion of the appropriate moment to end the entire process Once again the parallels 
between the thinking of senior SCAP officials ts remarkable, since there ts no like!t-
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hood ofKad田 merelyputtmg on the opinions of others to further his own interests 
Kades explamed m answer to yet another of my importunate questionings 
‘My own view of the reason for marchmg m place after the summer of '48 
except for completmg existmg reform projects was MacArthur's philosophy 
which he expressed at a press conference for foreign correspondents about a 
year earlier that the time had arrived to prepare a peace treaty because a 
prolonged occupation could lead to a“colonial”attitude, the Japanese would 
either become dependent on the U.S., or resentful which could give an impe 
tus to nal!onalistic (perhaps ultranationalistic) forces; either was would fos-
ter decay and decadence among Occupation personnel and result m arro 
gance contrary to American tradillon. ＇＜抑
Kades then suggested from hIS knowledge of MacArlhur’s approach that SCAP 
would, m his opinion，‘have said the same thing irrespecttve of the international 
scene and whether or not the Cold War was in its early stages but I do not know, of 
course what actually was in hIS mind. The ultimate pu叩osewas a peace-loving Ja-
pan; i e.to ca町yout the Potsdam Declaration; political reorientation toward the people-
source of power pnnc1ple had gone about as far as military occupatton could go 
without sowing seeds that would degrade the occupier as well as the occupied’uη 
There is no doubt that the protracted nature of the occupation was a disappoint-
ment to Kades I once quoted a statement from him (wtthout naming the source) and 
reminded him later of hIS concern over the swmg m Japanese politics that was ev1-
dent after 1948. He wrote back to say bluntly that‘I was way down in the dumps after 
出e1949 election', though he added -in September 1985 -'not now.＇【＇＂Indeed Kades 
presents evidence that his dISillusionment commenced earlter. He told me, for ex-
ample, m the period before conservative forces were entrenched in power after Pnme 
MmISter Yoshida's resounding January 1949 election victory that his experiences 
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over the purge programme had been disappointmg・Hewrote, when I sent him a 
scholarly a託iclefrom Hans Baerwald, the leadmg authority on the su町ect,that: 
'the Butotukai Purge was as frustratmg an aspect of the purge program as 
existed because even Japanese official as sympathetic to Occupation objec 
lives as Pnme Mmister Katayama, Tetsu, represented to GHQ that so many 
govemo四，chokuninand somn would be affected that governmental admm-
istration would be effectively crippled and so Govemment section consented 
to phasing the removal of those in increments beginning with the national 
level and ending locally, but, as Hans points out, the estimates were grossly 
exaggerated One good result Hans doesn’t mention: the foot-dragging con-
tributed to the determmation to dissolve the Naimusho itself, a more con-
structive action in the long run, tho both would have been better from our 
vantage point.・0勾
Ka des’role (and I might be said that of Generals Whllney and MacArthur too) 
ended long before the final signing of the San Francisco peace settlements dunng the 
Korean war. His departure from Japan has even been seen by some as a m句orevent 
in the evolution of the occupation <30> Kades was conscious from the months befo田
the spring of 1948 that change was imminent. When I questioned him on the familiar 
debate over the reality or not of what has become known as the reverse course m 
occupation policces he started categorically that there had never been any such thmg."" 
He wrote 
‘I was not conscious of any reve四ecourse in occupation policy and I am not 
sure what you mean by a change in direction. If you mean by a change in 
direcuon that to use your words the dynamic phase ended dunng the winter 
of 1947-48 and the digestive phase began, then I not only was conscwus of 
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出echange but encouraged it, at least so far as the Government Section was 
mvolved m the change. During that winter, I beheve I wrote on my own 
mitiative a memo to the division chiefs of the Gov't Section that the political 
phase or the m1tial phase (or something of the sort) of the occupation was 
endmg and that the Government Section should not imtiate any more laws or 
policies after those that were then in process of passage or of being prepared 
for submission to the Diet had been enacted by the Diet, subject, of cou四e,to 
a d!fection by the Supreme Commander or the Chief of Jhe Section to pro-
ceed with further leg1slat1on.ぺ＂＇
Charles Kades’contribution to the successes of the occupation of Japan 1s hkely 
to be reevaluated in the near future. His role was considerable in a complex, competi-
tive bureaucracy and his efforts to assist m the birth of a new Japan have been partly 
rewarded m the past half century凹＇His willingness to discuss each and every aspect 
of the occupation in which he was involved has served to illuminate numerous con-
cealed areas. His detailed responses to requests from others for mformat10n, how-
ever, were not made with the intenllon of dehberately inflating his mfluence but 
rather to explain and amplify existing archival findings. Perhaps a charactenstic post-
script to a letter he wrote m 1985 conveys some of the modesty and strengths of the 
man. He said then：‘Once you asked if you could quote me; the answer is of course 
“yes”if, but only 1f, there 1s anythmg worth quoting. I・veno passion for anonym-
ity.＇刊
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SUMMARY 
TALK ALL NIGHT: CHARLES KADES and 
HIS REFLECTIONS ON OCCUPIED JAPAN 
Charles Kades played an important role in the success of the Alhed凹 cupationof Japan. 
As deputy head of SCAP・sGovernment Section he instituted a series of political reforms that 
have had long-lasting influence in contempo悶叩Japan.This paper utilizes his coπ・espondence 
with the author to illustrate some of the v.ews and actions Kades took when working with 
Generals MacArthur and Whitney. It argues that greater attention on Kade.’contribution to出e
田cupationis surely now necessary. 
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チャールズ・ケーディスと占領下日本についての彼の省察
ロジャー・パックレイ
チャールズ・ケーディスは連合軍による日本占領が成功する上で，重
要な役割を演じた。連合軍最高司令官の民政局次長として，彼は，日本に
おいて長い間影響力をもち続けた一連の政治的改革を始めた．この論文
は，マッカーサー将軍そしてホィットニー将軍とともに働いていたときに
彼が持っていた見解や彼が行った行動のうちの幾つかを例証するために，
彼の筆者との書簡を利用している．この論文は，占領へのケーディスの貢
献に対し，今やより多くの注意が払われる必要があることを論ずるもので
ある．
